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process to explain the evolution of both the "corporeal structures" and the behavior of organisms. The process is eloquently summarized in his concluding comments in the chapter on instinct:
it may not be a logical deduction, but to my imagination it is far more satisfactory to look at such instincts ... as small consequences of one general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die. (Darwin, 1859 (Darwin, /1987 . That behavior is but another "organ" whereby animals adapt to their environments was also frequently echoed by the modern founders of ethology, Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen.
Staddon's misinterpretation of Darwin highlights a more general issue: Darwinism is not a single theory but a set of theories (e.g., Mayr, 1988, chap. 4) , and when different authors emphasize different theories they are likely to reach opposite conclusions. For example, Darwin's account of vestigial characters, or the phases of embryological development, appeals to common descent; in the procrustean framework of organism-versus environment-based accounts, we would probably classify common descent as an organismbased theory. Had I given an example of the workings of natural selection, such as the cellmaking instinct of the hive-bee (Darwin, 1859 (Darwin, / 1987 (Darwin, 1859 (Darwin, /1987 Organism-versus environment-based explanations. Consistent with his approach, Staddon avoids explicit definition of his terms. However, he often writes as if subject matter or terminology alone were sufficient criteria to classify a behavioral account as organism or environment based. Thus, when commenting on the behavior of Darwin's ants, Staddon classifies as organism based an account that (a) defines two competing action patterns and (b) suggests a hypothesis concerning the effects of various manipulations on the relative strength of the behaviors involved. Granted that (a) and (b) are not prerogatives of any type of account, Staddon must have relied on subject matter, instinctive behavior, to classify the account. On the other hand, when discussing the cumulative trace model, Staddon argues that a model that assumes an exponential decay of the effects of reinforcement qualifies as organism based because such a model is in fact a memory trace model. As no additional property of memory (e.g., storing, retrieving) or its trace was presumed, I conclude that the shift from an environment-to an organism-based model was achieved through relabeling.
Neither subject matter nor terminology are appropriate criteria, however. Instinctive behavior is no more typical of an organism than is noninstinctive behavior, and relabeling alone cannot change the nature of an explanation. What, then, is an organism-based account? It is an account based on inferred mental structures and ad hoc internal actions that are metaphorically extended from the outside world to the domain of the mind. To illustrate, consider the following account of a phenomenon well known to Staddon-transitive "inference" in pigeons (e.g., Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991) . Present Stimuli A and B to a pigeon and reinforce only pecks on A (A+ B-); when the discrimination is learned, introduce a new pair, B and C, and reinforce responses on B (B+C-). Repeat the procedure two more times by presenting C+D-and D + E -. At the end of training, when confronted with the new pair BD, pigeons frequently choose B, thus showing transitive "inference" (Fersen et al., 1991) . One explanation of this result is the mental line theory. During training, the bird orders the various stimuli along a mental line: A is anchored at the left end, B to its right, C and D next, and finally E at the right end of the line. Given a choice between B and D the bird scans the line from left to right and chooses the leftmost stimulus. A novel prediction follows: Reaction time should be an increasing function of the linear (mental) distance between the stimuli facing the subject.
The mental line theory qualifies as organism based not because of its subject matter or its labels but because the structures involved (the mental line) and the presumed actions (ordering the stimuli along the line, scanning the line) are not reducible to the history of the bird. Also, the aforementioned prediction concerning reaction time is derived from properties of the representation, not from historical variables.
The nature of a behavioral theory generally mirrors the practices and purposes of its respective theorist. Trying to characterize what an animal has learned, organism-based theorists vary the environmental context and observe the resulting behavioral changes. Because stimuli and responses are not defined functionally, the burden of explanation is placed in internal constructs and structures; knowledge acquisition in the form of a new representation constitutes the invariant of the learning episode. On the other hand, environment-based theories emphasize under what conditions learning takes place; hence, these theorists manipulate histories and record the ensuing behavioral changes. Internal processes are avoided by redefining stimulus and response classes, the invariants of the learning episode (Zuriff, 1985) .
Organism-based accounts may be compared with Ptolemy's geocentric model of the movement of celestial bodies. Epicycles, eccentrics, equants, and the like were contrived by Ptolemy and his predecessors to account for observational data and to predict eclipses and other astronomic events. However, none of the geometric devices was derived from more basic, physical laws; that had to wait for Newton. Analogously, most cognitive, organism-based constructs are developed to describe and predict behavioral data but are not rooted in more basic principles, whether neurophysiological or phylogenetic/ontogenetic in character. Moreover, geometry, the revered language of ancient times, has its modern equivalent in the revered language of information processing. Like Ptolemy's Almagest, which remained the astronomy book for almost 1,400 years because it predicted the movement of the planets with amazing accuracy, organism-based theories will endure until alternative, historybased accounts with equivalent or superior predictive power are advanced. In the meantime, the interpretations offered by behavior analysts, who, metaphorically speaking, have waved Newton but not delivered the Principia, remain prone to the criticism that they are justso stories (Dennett, 1983) , or that they leave their subjects "lost in history" (Roitblat, 1982, p. 394).
Behavior analysis, the source of its problems and its future. Although Staddon did not appropriately characterize organism-based explanations, he nevertheless prescribed part of the right therapy to relieve behavior analysis from its current malaise,1 namely, the historybased concept of internal state (see also Leyton, 1992, chap. 4, and particularly Casti, 1989, chap. 3). If recent events, such as JEAB's special issue on behavioral dynamics, are reliable predictors of the future, then the language of internal states-always defined as sets of equivalent histories-will become part of the vocabulary of behavior analysis.
Will internal states and corresponding dynamic analyses suffice to rescue the field? I doubt it, because internal states are the right medicine, but only for part of the problem. As I see it (Machado, 1992) , the major difficulties facing behavior analysis do not come from what behavior analysts do, but from what they do not do that is worth doing. In dealing almost exclusively with reinforcement learning in pigeons, rats, and humans, the field has ignored many types of behavior that.do not fit the framework of operant behavior (e.g., fixed action patterns, song learning in birds, spatial learning and memory) and many animal species (e.g., most invertebrates) in which learning plays only a minor role in their adaptation to the environment. Hence, the conceptualization of behavior is as narrow as its field of inquiry.
Ultimately, behavior analysis must choose between two courses of action: (a) In the spirit of Branch's (1992) editorial, behavior analysis can generalize its field of inquiry in order to include other types of behavior and other animals species, or (b) it can specialize in the study of reinforcement learning. The latter alternative is more likely than the former, however, for the following reason. Scientists organize themselves in small and local research groups. This demic structure of science (Hull, 1988) predicts that in times of intense bilateral criticism, when research domains rarely overlap and cross-references in scientific communication are not abundant, speciation is likely to occur. If speciation does occur, then behavior analysis faces some good and some bad news: The bad news is that most small populations simply die out without leaving a trace, except as fossils in the record of history; the good news is that most evolutionary advances do occur in small and cohesive populations.
